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Abstract—Anonymous networks enable entities to send 
messages without disclosing their identities. Many 
anonymous networks had been proposed already, such as 
Mixnet, DC-net, Crowds, etc., however, they still have 
serious drawbacks. Namely, they require tremendous 
computation overheads to transmit messages over networks. 
That is because asymmetric key encryption algorithms are 
used. This paper proposes ESEBM (Enhanced Symmetric 
Key Encryption based Mixnet), a new mechanism for 
anonymous communication that removes drawbacks of 
existing anonymous networks while exploiting symmetric 
key encryption algorithms. According to experimentations, 
throughput of ESEBM is about 1/4.4 of usual 
non-anonymous networks, and it achieves more than 36 
times higher throughput compared with Mixnet. In addition, 
different from existing anonymous networks, ESEBM can 
handle reply messages without any additional mechanism, 
and it can protect itself from various threats, e.g. DOS 
attacks and message forgeries. 
 
Index Terms—anonymous communication, mixnet, privacy 
protection, symmetric key encryption algorithm 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Identities of message senders are sometimes as 
sensitive as messages themselves. For example, a 
company may acquire highly confidential information 
about its rival companies from identities of their 
customers and suppliers. Therefore, the importance of 
anonymous communication is increasing as more people 
are being involved in network based communication. 
Anonymous networks are ones that enable message 
senders to send their messages without disclosing their 
identities, and various anonymous networks had been 
proposed already, e.g. Mix net [1, 5, 9], DC-net [2], 
Crowds [4], etc., to protect secrets of entities that 
communicate through networks. However, they still have 
serious drawbacks. For example, although Mix net is one 
of the most promising mechanisms, it requires the 
tremendous amount of computations to encrypt/decrypt 
messages that are forwarded from senders to their 
receivers. That is because asymmetric key 
encryption/decryption functions are adopted. In this paper, 
a new anonymous network ESEBM (Enhanced 
Symmetric Key Encryption based Mix net) is proposed 
that removes drawbacks of existing anonymous networks 
by using symmetric key encryption functions. 
 ESEBM consists of two parts, they are the CP 
generator (offline) and the anonymous channel (online) 
each of which is configured as a sequence of servers, and 
senders obtain secret keys of individual servers in the 
anonymous channel for encrypting their messages from 
the CP generator as off-line processes. Then, once 
encryption keys are shared between senders and servers, 
servers in the anonymous channel can efficiently transfer 
messages of senders to their receivers while exploiting 
symmetric key encryption functions. 
 According to experimentations, the capacity of 
ESEBM is more than 36 times higher than that of 
decryption type Mix net. Different from asymmetric key 
encryption functions, symmetric key encryption functions 
also enable message receivers to send reply messages to 
the anonymous senders in totally the same way as the 
senders send original messages, and consequently, 
anyone except the receivers cannot identify even whether 
messages are replies or not. Also, the CP generator 
configuration disables unauthorized entities to send 
messages because only authorized entities that had 
obtained secret keys from the CP generator can send 
messages. Therefore, ESEBM is secure against various 
kinds of attacks including DOS attacks and message 
forgeries (or modifications) that are difficult to prevent in 
existing anonymous networks. 
II.  REQUIREMENTS FOR ANONYMOUS NETWORKS 
Anonymous networks should satisfy the following 
requirements, i.e.,  
1. no one except senders of messages can know 
identities of the senders,  
2. message senders can confirm their message 
arrivals at their receivers without disclosing their 
identities,  
3. receivers can send reply messages back to the 
senders without knowing the senders’ identities,   * Graduate School of Engineering, University of Fukui  
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4. anonymous networks must be able to protect 
themselves from accesses from unauthorized 
entities, and  
5. anonymous networks must maintain their 
performances as same as usual ones.  
The 1st requirement is the most important one, and 
senders of messages must be concealed not only from the 
receivers but also from network managers, eavesdroppers 
and any other entities. The 2nd and the 3rd requirements 
are also important, and especially the 3rd one is essential 
because information exchanges between entities in many 
kinds of applications are carried out as conversations 
between them. To satisfy the 2nd requirement is not so 
difficult, e. g. senders can confirm deliveries of their 
messages without disclosing their identities when the 
receivers put receive signals in public bulletin boards. 
However, development of practical mechanisms that 
satisfy the 3rd requirement is not easy as it looks. For 
example, a receiver, which sends reply message MR, can 
identify the sender of the original message by 
eavesdropping on the communication channel to find out 
the entity that receives MR, because it knows MR. About 
the 4th requirement, because of anonymity, entities can 
behave dishonestly much easier than in usual 
communication systems, therefore, anonymous 
communication mechanisms must be endowed with the 
ability to protect them from dishonest events. The 
important thing here is that dishonest events must be 
prevented while maintaining anonymities of honest 
entities. Finally, to use anonymous networks in large 
scale applications where large volumes of messages are 
exchanged frequently, they must be efficient enough as 
usual non-anonymous networks.  
III.  RELATED WORKS 
This section summarizes currently available 
anonymous networks. Although many various kinds of 
anonymous networks had been proposed already, still 
they cannot satisfy the requirements in the previous 
section effectively. Mixnet is an example. It consists of a 
sequence of mixservers T1, T2, ---, TN, that relay 
messages from senders to their receivers. Where, senders 
send their messages while encrypting them repeatedly by 
public keys of multiple mixservers T1, T2, ---, TN in the 
sequence. Then, individual mixservers relay their 
receiving messages to their neighboring servers while 
decrypting them by their secret decryption keys finally to 
be sent to their receivers. Namely, sender S encrypts its 
message M to E(kN, E(kN-1, ---, E(k1, M) ---)) and each Tj 
that recieves E(kj, E(kj-1, ---, E(k1, M)---)) from Tj+1 
decrypts it to E(kj-1, ---, E(k1, M)---) by its secret 
decryption key kj
-1
 to forward it to Tj-1, where E(kj, M) is 
the encrypted form of M. In this message relaying process, 
each mixserver stores its incoming messages until 
pre-defined number of message arrivals, and shuffles 
decrypted messages before forwarding them to its 
neighbor. Therefore, each mixserver cannot identify the 
links between incoming and outgoing messages of other 
mixservers, and as a consequence, no one except the 
senders themselves can identify the senders of messages 
unless all mixservers conspire. 
 However, Mixnet uses asymmetric key encryption 
functions, such as RSA or ElGamal, and does not work 
efficiently in large scale systems where number of 
senders send large volume of messages. A lot of 
computation overheads are needed to encrypt and decrypt 
messages. Asymmetric key encryption functions also 
make Mixnet require additional mechanisms for sending 
reply messages to senders of the original messages, 
therefore, servers can know whether the messages are 
replies or not [1, 7]. Although Mixnet can protect itself 
from traffic analysis and replay attacks that are discussed 
in Sec. VI. A, it cannot prevent DOS attacks or message 
forgeries (or modifications). Encryption keys are publicly 
disclosed and servers cannot identify spam or forged 
messages because they receive messages in their 
encrypted forms, therefore, anyone can send spam and 
forged messages. 
Crowds [4] also consists of multiple relay servers as 
same as Mixnet, however, senders send their messages 
without encrypting them. Instead of encrypting messages, 
servers randomly decide whether to relay their receiving 
messages to their receivers or to the other servers in the 
network. Namely, when a server receives a message from 
a sender, it forwards it to other server with probability 1-p, 
and with probability p it sends it to the receiver. Then, it 
becomes difficult for entities other than the sender to 
identify the sender, and because no encryption or 
decryption process is included, Crowds can transfer 
messages efficiently. However, apparently it cannot 
disable entities to identify senders by tracing messages 
from their receivers to their senders. Namely, Crowds 
cannot satisfy the most important requirement of 
anonymous networks. 
Onion routing [3, 8] uses the same principle as Mixnet, 
i.e. messages travel from senders to receivers through 
sequences of servers (onion routers) while being 
encrypted by public keys of multiple onion routers. The 
difference from Mixnet is that senders in onion routing 
encrypt not only their messages but also their routes, i.e. 
servers in onion routing reroute their receiving messages 
in unpredictable ways. Therefore, onion routers need not 
wait for large number of messages to shuffle them and 
can reduce message travelling times. However, onion 
routing uses asymmetric key encryption functions and 
shares the same drawbacks with Mixnet. An additional 
problem of onion routing is that it is vulnerable to timing 
attacks, i.e. an adversary can embed messages to know 
the flow times of different paths. Then, while using these 
message flow times, entities can know senders of 
messages by observing message sending and receiving 
times of individual senders and receivers.  
Other anonymous networks such as Tor [8], buses for 
anonymous message delivery [6], Peer to Peer 
anonymous mechanisms [12], etc. have the same 
drawbacks as Mixnet or Onion routing. 
In DC-net [2], sender Sq constitutes a group {S1, S2, ---, 
SQ} that includes itself, and entities in the group generate 
their secret numbers {N1, N2, ---, NQ} so that the sum of 
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 them becomes 0 in advance. While using its generating 
secret number, Sq encrypts its message M to M + Nq to 
send it to its receiver R. At the same time, each Sj in the 
group also sends its secret number Nj to R. Therefore, R 
can extract M from messages of {S1, S2, ---, SQ}, i.e. N1 
+N2 + --- + (M + Nq) + Nq+1 + --- + NQ = M + 0 = M. 
However, no one except Sq can know the sender of M, 
because each Sj does not know secret numbers of other 
senders. 
As shown above, DC-net provides almost perfect 
anonymity, however it has fatal drawbacks about its 
performance, i.e. multiple senders must behave 
synchronously. Multiple senders must agree with each 
other about random numbers to encrypt messages, also 
only one sender can send a message at a time. Therefore, 
it is applicable only to small and closed networks. Here, it 
must be noted that each Sj must change random secret 
number Nj at every message sending. If every Sj uses 
same random secret number for different messages sent 
from senders in the group, an entity X that eavesdrops on 
the communication can easily identify senders of the 
messages. Namely, when Sj sends same number Nj as its 
1st and 2nd messages, X can know that Sj’s random 
secret number is Nj. Also, when Sj sends (Mj + Nj) and Nj 
as its 1st and 2nd messages, it is easy for X to extract Mj 
and to identify the sender.  
To decrease computation volumes of encryptions and 
decryptions, SEBM
 
[13]
 
exploits symmetric key 
encryption functions. SEBM consists of 2 parts, the 
encryption part and the decryption part, and messages are 
forwarded to their receivers while being encrypted by 
servers in the encryption part and decrypted by servers in 
the decryption part. Here different from other anonymous 
networks, senders themselves are included as relay 
servers in both parts to enable the use of symmetric key 
encryption functions. Therefore, although SEBM can 
satisfactory reduce the computation overheads caused by 
asymmetric key encryptions, senders included in the 
encryption and decryption parts reduce the stability of the 
communication. For example, when senders, i.e. 
volunteer servers, stop operations, messages cannot be 
forwarded. As another drawback, because messages in 
SEBM must be encrypted and decrypted by servers both 
in the encryption and the decryption parts, their travelling 
times increase. Also, it cannot efficiently handle reply 
messages or prevent accesses from unauthorized entities 
either. 
IV.  ESEBM (ENHANCED SYMMETRIC KEY ENCRYPTION 
BASED MIXNET) 
This section proposes ESEBM, a scheme for 
anonymous networks that efficiently satisfies all the 
requirements listed in the previous section. ESEBM 
removes most drawbacks that exist in other anonymous 
networks, i.e. it can transfer messages without large 
overheads, it does not require any additional mechanism 
for forwarding reply messages, and it can protect itself 
from various attacks.  
A. ESEBM Configuration 
ESEBM can be considered as a kind of decryption type 
Mixnet, in which asymmetric key encryption functions 
are replaced by symmetric ones, where the encryption 
keys used for sending messages are distributed to senders 
in advance. At the same time, it is considered as SEBM in 
which volunteer servers are replaced by permanent ones 
in order to make the network stable enough [15]. 
As shown in Fig. 1, ESEBM consists of 2 parts, i.e. the 
anonymous channel and the concealing pattern generator 
(CP generator). The anonymous channel is configured as 
a sequence of N servers as same as Mixnet, and the CP 
generator consists of Z-groups, where the g-th group is 
configured by Ng servers, and each server in the 
anonymous channel is corresponded to a single server in 
the CP generator and vice versa, therefore N = N1 + N2 + 
--- + NZ. In the remainder, notation Tg(k) that represents 
the k-th server in the g-th group of the CP generator is 
used also for representing the p-th server Tp in the 
anonymous channel that corresponds to Tg(k), and vice 
versa. 
ESEBM adopts onetime pad as the base algorithm to 
encrypt and decrypt messages, and sender S of message 
MS requests servers in the CP generator to issue a bit 
string called concealing pattern (CP), a pad for encrypting 
MS, in advance as an off-line process. 
Provided that servers generate their h-th CP at the 
request of S, each server Tj in the CP generator generates 
its h-th CP constructor xj(h), and the h-th concealing 
pattern X(h) is constructed as XOR of them, i.e. X(h) = 
x1(h)x2(h)---xN(h). Then, S sends MS to the first 
server T1 in the anonymous channel while encrypting it to 
MSX(h). Therefore, the length of CPs and CP 
constructors are defined as LM, which is the length of 
messages. When S sends a long message MS, MS is 
divided into multiple frames of length LM. Here, S uses 
different CPs for encrypting different messages including 
different frames of the same message. Also, although 
notations X(h) and xj(h) are accompanied by h they do not 
include any information about h. 
 
Figure 1. ESEBM configuration 
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Figure 2. Message structure 
As same as usual Mixnet, each server in the anonymous 
channel stores its receiving messages until it receives the 
predefined number of messages, and decrypts, shuffles 
and forwards them to its neighboring server finally to be 
sent to their receivers. Here, each Tj decrypts its receiving 
encrypted MS by simply XORing it by its CP constructor 
xj(h) that constitutes X(h), the CP that S had used to 
encrypt MS, then, it is apparent that MSX(h) is 
transformed to MS when all servers decrypt it. On the 
other hand, because each server knows only its CP 
constructor xj(h) in X(h), no one can know the sender of 
MS unless all servers conspire with each other as same as 
in usual Mixnet.  
However, different from usual Mixnet where all 
senders encrypt their messages by using the same single 
public encryption key of each mixserver, in ESEBM, 
senders encrypt different messages by using different CPs, 
Therefore to enable Tj to identify its CP constructor xj(h) 
that constitutes X(h) for encrypting MS, message MS 
consists of the message part and the tag part as shown in 
Fig. 2. The message part maintains encrypted message MS, 
i.e. MSX(h), and the tag part maintains a sequence of 
tags, i.e. vector Q(h) = {Q1(h), Q2(h), ---, QN(h)}, where 
server Tj that had generated the CP constructor xj(h) to 
construct X(h) can know xj(h) from Qj(h). Here, Qj(h) is 
constructed so that no one can trace the message by it and 
no one except Tj can identify xj(h) from it. 
B. Behavior of the CP Generator   
To disable entities to trace messages forwarded 
through the anonymous channel, not only 
correspondences between the message parts of input and 
output messages of individual servers but also those 
between their tag parts must be concealed. To achieve this, 
the CP generator generates 2 kinds of secret encryption 
keys shared between senders and individual servers, the 
one is CPs and the other is tag vectors (TVs). The CP 
generator is a set of server groups, each of which consists 
of at least 3 servers that generate their secret CP 
constructors and TV constructors independently of others 
to construct CPs and TVs jointly with other servers. Here, 
senders communicate only with servers in the 1st group, 
i.e. with T1(1), T1(2), ---, and T1(N1), to disable servers in 
the other groups to know the senders as shown in Fig. 1. 
As discussed already, concealing pattern X(h) is 
calculated as XOR of CP constructor xj(h) (j = 1, 2, ---, N) 
generated by each server Tj, and disables anyone to trace 
the message parts of a message relayed by the servers. On 
the other hand, individual elements of N-dimensional tag 
vector Q(h) = {Q1(h), Q2(h), ---, QN(h)} disable anyone to 
trace the tag part of a message relayed by the servers, and 
each Qi(h) is calculated as XOR of the i-th elements of 
each N-dimensional TV constructor qj(h) = {0, ---0, 
qj(j+1)(h), qj(j+2)(h), ---, qjN(h)} generated by Tj (j = 1, ---, 
N). Here, each qjk(h) in vector qj(h) is a bit pattern of 
length LT as discussed later, 0 represents an all zero bit 
pattern of length LT, and a sequence of j-zero patterns 
precedes before the (N-j)-secret bit patterns {qj(j+1)(h), 
qj(j+2)(h), ---, qjN(h)}. By XORing CP constructors and TV 
constructors of individual serves, concealing pattern X(h) 
and tag vector Q(h) are calculated as X(h) = 
x1(h)x2(h)---xN(h) and Q(h)={0, q12(h), 
q13(h)q23(h), ---, q1N(h)q2N(h)---q(N-1)N(h)}. Here, 
the length of bit pattern xj(h) is equal to the message frame 
length LM as mentioned before, and the last server TN does 
not generate its TV constructor. 
CPs and TVs above are generated as follows. Provided 
that T1(k) in the 1st group of the CP generator corresponds 
to Tk* in the anonymous channel, i.e. T1(1) = T1*, T1(2) = 
T2*, ---, and T1(N1) = TN1*, firstly, sender S sends a set of 
its secret private vectors (PVs) {P1(h), P2(h), ---, PN1(h)} 
as a request for a CP to servers T1*, T2*, ---, TN1*, 
respectively, as shown in Fig. 3 (a). Here, each Pj(h) is 
vector {pj0(h), pj1(h), ---pjN(h)} and except pj0(h), pjk(h) is a 
bit pattern of the same length as element qjk(h) in TV 
constructor qj(h). Bit pattern pj0(h) has the same length as 
CP constructor xj(h).  
Then, T1* that receives the request with P1(h), generates 
its CP constructor x1*(h) and TV constructor q1*(h) = {0, 
---, 0, q1*(1*+1)(h), q1*(1*+2)(h), ---, q1*N(h)}. It also 
generates ID1*(x1*(h), q1*(h)) as an address of CP and TV 
constructor pair (x1*(h), q1*(h)). Here, T1* maintains its CP 
table, a list of CP and TV constructors that it had 
generated, and ID1*(x1*(h), q1*(h)) represents the address 
of the constructor pair {x1*(h), q1*(h)} in the table. Also, 
the length of each bit pattern qjk(h) in TV constructor 
qj(h) is set as LT, the length of IDj(xj(h), qj(h)). 
Then, X(1, h) and Q(1, h), the h-th CP and TV that the 
1st group generates, are constructed by 1st server T1
*
as 
X(1, h) = p10(h)x1*(h) and Q(1, h) = {p11(h), p12(h), ---, 
p11*(h)ID1*(x1*(h), q1*(h)), p1(1*+1)(h)q1*(1*+1)(h), 
p1(1*+2)(h)q1*(1*+2)(h), ---, p1N(h)q1*N(h)}, respectively. 
X(1, h) and Q(1, h) are then forwarded to T2*. However, 
to protect them from eavesdropping, they are encrypted 
by the secret key k1* that is shared between T1* and T2*, 
i.e. X(1, h) and Q(1, h) are sent to T2* in the form E(k1*, 
X(1, h), Q(1, h)), where, E(k1*, x) represents x encrypted 
by key k1*. It is also possible that T1* encrypts X(1, h) and 
Q(1, h) by using a public key of T2*, however to decrease 
encryption overheads, a symmetric key encryption 
function is adopted here. 
T2* that receives E(k1*, {X(1, h), Q(1, h)}) decrypts it 
to {X(1, h), Q(1, h)}, and generates its CP constructor 
x2*(h) to modify X(1, h) to X(1, h) = 
p10(h)p20(h)x1*(h)x2*(h). T2* also generates TV 
constructor q2*(h) = (0, ---0, q2*(2*+1)(h), q2*(2*+2)(h), ---, 
q2*N(h)) to modify Q(1, h) to {p11(h)p21(h), 
p12(h)p22(h), ---, p11*(h)p21*(h)ID1*(x1*(h), q1*(h)), 
p1(1*+1)(h)p2(1*+1)(h)q1*(1*+1)(h), ---, p12*(h)p22*(h) 
q1*2*(h)ID2*(x2*(h), q2*(h)), p1(2*+1)(h)p2(2*+1)(h) 
q1*(2*+1)(h)q2*(2*+1)(h), ---,p1N(h)p2N(h)q1*N(h) 
q2*N(h)}.  
Here as same as T1*, T2* also maintains its CP table, 
and ID2*(x2*(h), q2*(h)) represents the address where 
tag part message part 
(Ms⊕X(h))  Q1(h) Q2(h) QN(h) 
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 {x2*(h), q2*(h)} is located in it. Also, it is not necessary 
but to simplify the descriptions, it is assumed that servers 
in the anonymous channel are arranged so that Tj(g) is 
placed at the earlier position in the anonymous channel 
than Tj(h) when g < h, for every j-th group. Then, X(1, h) 
and Q(1, h) are sent to T3* while being encrypted by k2*, a 
secret encryption key shared between T2* and T3*, and this 
process continues until TN1* calculates X(1, h) and Q(1, 
h). Therefore, X(1, h) and Q(1, h) = {Q1(1, h), Q2(1, h), 
---, QN(1, h)}, the CP and the TV pair generated by the 
1st group becomes as shown in equations (1) – (3). 
 
(a) 1st group 
 
(b) r-th group 
Figure 3. Behaviour of the CP generator 
X(1, h) = p10p20---p(N1)0x1*(h) 
x2*(h)---x(N1)*(h)  (1) 
for g* included in the 1st group 
Qg*(1, h) = p1g*(h)p2g*(h)---p(N1)g*(h) 
q1*g*(h)q2*g*(h)---q(g-1)*g*(h) 
IDg*(xg*(h), qg*(h)), where q0*g*(h) = 0  (2) 
for i not included in the 1st group, 
Qi(1, h) = p1i(h)p2i(h)---p(N1)i(h)q1*i(h) 
q2*i(h)---q(gj*)i(h), where gj* < i < g(j+1)*  (3) 
Severs in the r-th group (r > 1) behave in the same way 
as the 1st group as shown in Fig. 3 (b), where server Tr(k), 
the k-th server in the r-th group, corresponds to Tk# in the 
anonymous channel. However, different from the 1st 
group where senders generate PVs and sends them as a 
request for a CP to severs T1*, T2*, ---, TN1*, servers T1#, 
T2#, ---, TNr# in the r-th group generate CP and TV pairs 
spontaneously without requests from senders, also the last 
server TNr# in the r-th group generates group blinding 
vector B(h) = {B1(h), B2(h), ---, BNr(h)}. Then, the r-th 
group calculates X(r, h) and Q(r, h) = {Q1(r, h), Q2(r, h), 
---, QN(r, h)} as its h-th CP and TV values as shown in 
equations (4) – (6). In the equations, the j-th element 
Bj(h) of B(h) = {B1(h), B2(h), ---, BNr(h)} is a vector of 
patterns {bj0(h), bj1(h), ---, bjN(h)}, where the length of 
bj0(h) is LM and the length of bjk(h) is LT for each k.  
X(r, h) = b10b20---b(Nr)0x1#(h)x2#(h) 
---xNr#(h) (4) 
for g# included in the r-th group 
Qg#(r, h) = b1g#(h)b2g#(h)---b(Nr)g#(h)q1#g#(h) 
q2#g#(h)---q(g-1)#g#(h)IDg#(xg#(h), qg#(h)), 
where q0#g#(h) = 0 (5) 
for i not included in the r-th group,  
Qi(r, h) = b1i(h)b2i(h)---b(Nr)i(h)q1#i(h) 
q2#i(h)---q(gj#)i(h), where gj# < i < g(j+1)#  (6) 
After calculating X(r, h) and Q(r, h) as equations (4) – 
(6), TNr# removes group blinding vector B(h) by XORing 
them by B(h). Namely, they are transformed as shown in 
equations (7) – (9). 
X(r, h) = x1#(h)x2#(h)---xNr#(h) (7) 
for g# included in the r-th group 
Qg#(r, h) = q1#g#(h)q2#g#(h)---q(g-1)#g#(h) 
IDg#(xg#(h), qg#(h)), where q0#g#(h) = 0 (8) 
for i not included in the r-th group,  
Qi(r, h) = q1#i(h)q2#i(h)---q(gj#)i(h), 
where gj# < i < g(j+1)#  (9) 
The last server Tr(Nr) = TNr# in the r-th group also 
receives X(r+1, h) and Q(r+1, h), the CP and TV values 
generated by the (r+1)-th group, from Tr+1(Nr+1), the last 
server in the (r+1)-th group, and it calculates X(r, 
h)X(r+1, h), and Q(r, h)Q(r+1, h) to combine CPs and 
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TVs generated by the r-th and the (r+1)-th groups into the 
single CP and TV, respectively. Then, Tr(Nr) waits for the 
arrivals of predefined number of CP and TV pairs, and 
shuffles them to sends the results to the last server 
Tr-1(Nr-1) of the (r-1)-th group. As the result of the 
behaviors of all groups, the last server of the 1st group, 
i.e. T1(N1), generates the CP and TV as equations (10) 
and (11). 
X(h) = p10(h)p20(h)---p(N1)0(h)x1(h) 
x2(h)---xN(h)  (10) 
Qg(h) = p1g(h)---p(N1)g(h)q1g(h)--- 
q(g-1)g(h)IDg(xg(h), qg(h)), where q0g(h) = 0 (11) 
Then, T1(N1) sends X(h) and Q(h) = {Q1(h), Q2(h), ---, 
QN(h)} to sender S, and S removes private vectors PVs 
from X(h) and Q(h) by XORing them by PVs. As the 
result, finally CP and TV values become as (12) and (13). 
X(h) = x1(h)x2(h)---x(N-1)(h)xN(h)  (12)  
Qg(h) = q1g(h)---q(g-1)g(h)IDg(xg(h), qg(h)),  
where q0g(h) = 0  (13) 
It must be noted that because PVs and group blinding 
vectors are secrets of sender S and last server of each 
group (except the 1st group), respectively, and each 
server Tj does not disclose xj(h) or qj(h) to others, any 
server cannot know CP or TV constructors of other 
servers. No server can know X(h) or Q(h) either unless all 
servers conspire with each other. 
C. Behavior of the Anonymous Channel  
Fig. 4 shows the behavior of the anonymous channel. 
Firstly, sender S encrypts its message MS by XORing it 
by concealing pattern X(h) that it had acquired from 
T1(N1). S also attaches tag vector Q(h) = {Q1(h), Q2(h), 
---, QN(h)} corresponding to X(h), to the message, and 
sends {MS = x1(h)x2(h)---xN(h)MS, Q1(h), Q2(h), 
---, QN(h)} to the 1st server T1 in the anonymous channel. 
Here, Q1(h) has the form ID1(x1(h), q1(h)).  
Then, T1 that receives {x1(h)x2(h)---xN(h)MS, 
Q1(h), Q2(h), ---, QN(h)} retrieves CP constructor x1(h) 
and TV constructor q1(h) from its CP table based on 
ID1(x1(h), q1(h)) in Q1(h), calculates XOR of x1(h) and 
MS, and q1j(h) and Qj(h) for each j as new values of MS 
and Qj(h). Therefore, MS and Qj(h) become MS = 
x1(h)(x1(h)x2(h)---xN(h)MS) = 
x2(h)x3(h)---xN(h)MS and Qj(h) = 
q1j(h)(q1j(h)q2j(h)---q(j-1)j(h)IDj(xj(h), qj(h))) = 
q2j(h)q3j(h)---q(j-1)j(h)IDj(xj(h), qj(h)). After that, T1 
removes Q1(h) from the tag part, waits for the predefined 
number of message arrivals, and shuffles them to forward 
each result to server T2. 
All servers in the anonymous channel perform in the 
same way, i.e. each Tj converts its incoming message to 
{MS = xj+1(h)xj+2(h)---xN(h)MS, Qj+1(h), Qj+2(h), ---, 
QN(h)}, where Qg(h) = q(j+1)g(h)---q(g-1)g(h)IDg(xg(h), 
qg(h)). Consequently, when TN, the last server in the 
anonymous channel, completes its operations on the 
message, the message is converted into MS, and TN can 
deliver MS to its receiver while extracting the address of 
the receiver from MS.  
The anonymous channel together with the CP 
generator protects identities of message senders from 
various threats as follows. Firstly, each server Tj 
transforms the message part while XORing it by CP 
constructor xj(h) which is not known to other servers and 
also Tj assigns different values as CP constructors for 
encrypting different messages. Therefore no one 
including other server Ti can identify the input and output 
pair of Tj that corresponding to MS by comparing message 
parts of Tj’s receiving and forwarding messages. For Ti, 2 
input and output pairs of Tj, e. g. 
{xj(h)xj+1(h)---xN(h)MS, xj+1(h1)---xN(h1)M1} 
and {xj(h)xj+1(h)---xN(h)MS, xj+1(h2)---xN(h2) 
M2}, have equal possibilities that they are encrypted 
form pairs of MS. As a consequence, it is impossible for 
entities including servers to identify the sender of 
message MS by tracing the message parts of messages 
unless all servers conspire. 
Any entity cannot trace MS by examining the tag parts 
of messages either. Because each Tj generates different 
secret TV constructors for different messages and assigns 
different bit patterns to individual elements {qj(j+1)(h), ---, 
qjN(h)} in TV constructor qj(h), it is impossible for other 
entities to identify links between incoming messages of Tj 
and its outgoing messages by examining pattern 
transitions in individual tags made by Tj. Namely, 
individual tags change their forms within Tj in different 
ways, and entities except Tj cannot extract any relation 
between transitions of different tags in the tag part to 
identify input and output pairs of same messages. 
Also, although, each server Tj* in the 1st group in the 
CP generator can know the senders of encrypted 
messages from their CP and TV constructors, because Tj* 
generates them at requests of the senders, when Tj* is 
placed at the earlier position of the anonymous channel, 
its tags disappear in the later positions, i.e. the tag parts of 
messages that are received by servers at later positions of 
the anonymous channel do not include tags of any server 
in the 1st group, therefore even if Tj* conspires with 
servers at the later positions, it is not possible to identify 
senders. 
 
Figure 4. Behavior of the anonymous channel 
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   V.  REPLIES TO ANONYMOUS SENDERS 
Different from other existing mechanisms [2, 7], in 
ESEBM, individual servers can handle reply messages to 
anonymous senders without any additional mechanism. 
This means that servers cannot decide even whether a 
message is the reply or not. Sender S can receive reply 
messages as follows. Firstly, S obtains 2 CP and TV pairs 
{X(h1), Q(h1)}, {X(h2), Q(h2)}, and constructs its message 
while attaching tag vector Q(h2) and its encrypted address 
AS to its sending message MS as shown in Fig. 5 (a). 
Namely, S constructs MS║Q(h2)║(XU(h2)AS), 
concatenation of MS, Q(h2), and XU(h2)AS. Where bit 
strings XU(h2) and XL(h2) are upper and lower parts of bit 
string X(h2), in other words, X(h2) = XU(h2)║XL(h2). Also 
it is assumed that message MS includes its destination 
address at its left most bit positions. 
After that, S encrypts MS║Q(h2)║XU(h2)AS to 
X(h1)(MS║Q(h2)║XU(h2)AS), and sends 
{X(h1)(MS║Q(h2)║XU(h2)AS), Q1(h1), Q2(h1), ---, 
QN(h1)} to the 1st server T1 in the anonymous channel. 
Then, T1 decrypts it by x1(h1), CP constructor of T1. As a 
result, the message becomes 
{x1(h1)X(h1)(MS║Q(h2)║XU(h2)AS), Q2(h1), ---, 
QN(h1)} = {x2(h1)---xN(h1)(MS║Q(h2)║XU(h2)AS), 
Q2(h1),---, QN(h1)}. Each server Tj in the anonymous 
channel carries out the same procedure until receiver R 
receives MS║Q(h2)║XU(h2)AS. Then R can extract 
message MS, encrypted address XU(h2)AS of S and tag 
vector Q(h2) to construct its reply message as 
{(XU(h2)AS)║MR, Q1(h2), ---, QN(h2)} to be encrypted to 
X(h2){XU(h2)AS║MR} = {AS║XL(h2)MR}, by the 
anonymous channel as shown in Fig. 5 (b). Therefore, TN 
can deliver XL(h2)MR to S and finally S that knows 
XL(h2) decrypts XL(h2)MR to XL(h2)XL(h2)MR = MR. 
In the above, R receives MS║Q(h2)║XU(h2)AS, and it 
cannot know AS because XU(h2) is known only to S. Also, 
message XU(h2)AS║MR sent by R is transformed to 
AS║XL(h2)MR in the anonymous channel, therefore, no 
one except S can know that XL(h2)MR corresponds to 
MR, and consequently even receiver R that knows MR 
cannot identify the original sender of MS. In this way, 
servers in ESEBM can handle original and reply messages 
totally in the same way, different from usual Mixnets 
where each mixserver adds extra operations on reply 
messages. 
VI.  EVALUATION OF ESEBM 
A. Analysis of ESEBM Behavior   
ESEBM satisfies the requirements for anonymous 
networks listed in Sec. II as follows. Firstly as discussed 
in Sec IV. C, no one except senders themselves can trace 
messages from senders to receivers. Secondly, the 
message reply mechanism discussed in Sec. V enables 
receivers to send replies to senders of original messages 
without knowing identities of the senders. Also by this 
reply mechanism, senders can confirm the deliveries of 
their messages. In addition the reply mechanism of 
ESEBM does not require additional operations on reply 
messages, therefore different from other existing 
anonymous networks, servers cannot know even whether 
their handling messages are replies or not. 
 
(a) From sender to receiver 
 
(b) From receiver to sender 
Figure 5. Anonymous reply mechanism 
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About the efficiency, the configuration of ESEBM 
where senders must obtain CPs before sending their 
individual messages is obviously a disadvantage, e. g. 
message travelling times increase when durations required 
for obtaining CPs are counted. However because senders 
can obtain CPs as offline processes, actual message 
traveling times can be suppressed at values comparable to 
Mixnet. Also, when each server is configured by 2 
independent CPUs, tasks for generating CPs and 
forwarding messages can be assigned to different CPUs so 
that the anonymous channel can forward messages 
without being interrupted by tasks for the CP generator. 
Then, despite of the disadvantages of the CP obtaining 
process, ESEBM configuration enables anonymous 
networks to adopt symmetric key encryption functions 
that make ESEBM efficient enough as usual 
non-anonymous networks to handle messages in practical 
scale applications as demonstrated in the next subsection.  
ESEBM configuration brings advantageous features not 
only about the efficiency but also about security as 
follows. Among various threats to networks, DOS attacks 
[10], in which meaningless or spam messages are sent to 
decrease availabilities of networks, and illegitimate 
message forgeries (modifications), in which malicious 
entities forge (modify) messages sent from anonymous 
senders, are especially serious in anonymous networks. 
Different from in usual networks where all entities that 
send messages can be identified if costs and efforts are not 
considered, in anonymous networks where identities of 
senders are completely hidden, entities can behave 
dishonestly more easily. In addition, about message 
forgeries (modifications), in many cases receivers cannot 
notice even if their receiving messages are forged 
(modified) because their senders are anonymous. 
The CP generator in ESEBM reduces the occurrence of 
DOS attacks substantially and makes forged (modified) 
messages detectable. Namely, senders must attach 
consistent TVs to their messages to let servers transfer the 
messages; however, the CP generator gives CPs and TVs 
only to authorized entities. Therefore, unauthorized 
entities must send their messages while attaching 
nonregistered TVs, and servers in ESEBM that cannot 
find CPs and TVs from their CP tables discard the 
messages immediately, as the consequence, messages 
from unauthorized entities do not decrease the availability 
of the network. About the malicious message forgeries 
(modification), provided that the malicious entity X does 
not know the original message M, X cannot forge 
(modify) encrypted M consistently because no one except 
the sender of M knows the CP used for encrypting M, then 
the receiver of M can notice the forgeries (modification) 
because its receiving message is meaningless. 
In the same way, ESEBM disables entities to carry out 
traffic analysis attacks and replay attacks. A traffic 
analysis attack is a way to identify the sender S of a 
message M by sending multiple replies to it [7, 14]. 
Namely, when receiver R of M sends many replies at a 
time or periodically to S, R can identify S by observing 
entities that receives many messages at a time or 
periodically. However, in ESEBM every message must 
have different CPs and TVs, and this means that every 
server discards CP and TV constructors in its CP table 
once they are used. Therefore, provided that at least one of 
the servers is honest, even when R sends multiple replies 
only one of them is delivered to S, and R cannot identify 
S. It must be noted that, it is also possible to enable 
receivers to send up to predefined number of replies. If 
each server Tj maintains F(h), the number of messages 
allowed to send by using tag vector Q(h), in its CP table in 
addition to {xj(h), qj(h)}, Tj does not invalidate {xj(h), 
qj(h)} until it receives F(h)-messages attached by Q(h). 
In a replay attack [11], an entity X identifies sender S 
of message M by eavesdropping on the network to pick 
M*, encrypted form of M, just sent from S, and putting M* 
to the network repeatedly. Then, because M is delivered to 
the same receiver R many times, X can easily identify the 
correspondence between S and M received by R. 
Apparently ESEBM can disable replay attacks in the same 
way as disabling traffic analysis attacks.  
B. Message Processing Performance  
Performance of ESEBM has been compared with that 
of the usual non-anonymous networks and Mixnet each of 
which consisted of multiple PCs that worked as relay 
servers. Where individual PCs were equipped with 
1.6GHz CPUs and 1GB of RAM and they were connected 
by 100Mbits/sec Ethernet. Because delays of message 
arrivals depend on the number of relay servers and the 
time that individual servers must wait for shuffling 
messages, only the throughput were compared while 
changing the sizes of messages. For evaluating ESEBM, 
16 tags each of which consisted of 64 bits were attached to 
individual messages, therefore for ESEBM, the actual 
length of a 10 Kbits message is 11 Kbits for example. For 
Mixnet, RSA with 1K bits length key was adopted as the 
encryption function. In real applications, a sender must 
combine its message M with random secret numbers to 
make the encryption function probabilistic. Also to 
maintain strengths of encryption keys, different servers 
must use different modulo arithmetic. However in this 
evaluation, random bit strings were not attached to 
messages, and all servers used the same modulo 
arithmetic. 
Table 1 shows the computation times required by each 
server in non-anonymous network, ESEBM and Mixnet to 
transfer different sizes of messages, and Fig. 6 graphically 
represents them. For example, while ESEBM needs less 
than 6 seconds to transfer a 20Mbits message, Mixnet 
needs more than 3 minutes to transfer the same message. 
Fig. 7 shows the volume of messages that usual 
non-anonymous networks, ESEBM and Mixnet can send 
within 1 second. These results show that, although the 
throughput of ESEBM is 1/4.4 of that of non-anonymous 
networks, it is more than 36 times higher than that of 
Mixnet. According to statistics [16], e-mail message size 
is 59KB on average, therefore, even in the environments 
used for evaluations, ESEBM can handle 7 clients at a 
time that send usual e-mail messages while the 
non-anonymous network can handle 33 clients at a time. 
On the other hand, Mixnet can handle only 0.2 clients. 
The beneficial thing is that, when multiple processors are 
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 available, volume of messages can be processed almost in 
parallel. Therefore, ESEBM can transfer the same volume 
of messages as usual non-anonymous networks do when 
each server is constituted by multiple processors and 
memories with 4.4 times of costs. Here, although it 
depends on individual applications, value 4.4 can be 
considered acceptable. On the other hand, to improve the 
performance of Mixnet as non-anonymous networks, 158 
times of costs are necessary. Namely, ESEBM can be 
used for large scale networks, in which number of clients 
exchange usual sizes of messages at less extra costs. 
TABLE I.  COMPUTATION TIME FOR TRANSFERRING DIFFERENT SIZES 
OF MESSAGES 
Message size 
Mbits  
Non-anonymous 
(msec) 
ESEBM 
(msec) 
Mixnet 
(msec) 
10 625 2780 105255 
20 1230 5510 207440 
30 1924 8556 310986 
40 2520 11225 412679 
50 3125 14127 528276 
60 3745 17342 --- 
70 4325 19710 --- 
80 4995 22862 --- 
90 5643 25595 --- 
100 6246 28344 --- 
 
Figure 6. Comparison of computation time for transferring 
different sizes of messages 
 
Figure 7. Comparison of throughputs for transferring 
different sizes of messages 
About the breakdown of message processing time of 
each server in ESEBM, it consists of shuffling (31%), 
message decryption (26%), and others (43%). On the 
other hand, message processing time of each server in 
Mixnet consists of shuffling (0.8%), message decryption 
(98.6%), and others (0.6%). As shown above, different 
from Mixnet in which message decryptions require 123 
times of message shuffling time, in ESEBM, message 
decryptions require less than 0.84 times of the shuffling 
time. When the fact that both ESEBM and Mixnet shuffle 
same number of messages is considered, this means that 
message decryption process in Mixnet degrades its overall 
performance seriously. In other words, symmetric key 
encryption functions used in ESEBM had successfully 
reduced decryption times. Namely, while RSA used in 
Mixnet requires the number of multiplications that is 
proportional to log2(n), onetime pad used in ESEBM 
requires only a single XOR operation, where n is the size 
of encryption keys.  
SEBM also uses symmetric key encryption functions 
[13], and as ESEBM, it can achieve the higher throughput 
than other anonymous networks such as Mixnet. However, 
when compared with ESEBM, in SEBM, more servers 
must be involved in forwarding messages, because it 
consists of encryption and decryption servers. Therefore, 
message traveling times in SEBM become longer than that 
of ESEBM, i.e. different from in ESEBM where messages 
are encrypted by their senders, in SEBM, they are 
encrypted by a sequence of encryption servers. As other 
advantages of ESEBM over SEBM, ESEBM works more 
stably because all servers in ESEBM are permanent 
servers different from SEBM where senders are included 
as servers. Also a mechanism for reply messages is not 
straightforward in SEBM. 
  VII.  CONCLUSION 
Enhanced symmetric key encryption based Mixnet has 
been proposed that removes the drawbacks of many 
existing anonymous networks such as Mixnet, DC-net, etc. 
It satisfies all the requirements of anonymous networks. 
Most importantly, while being supported by concealing 
patterns, those requirements are satisfied in a simple and 
efficient way. Unlike complicated Mixnet based systems, 
the simplified computational requirements of individual 
entities make the scheme practical and scalable. 
As a drawback of ESEBM, a sender must acquire a 
concealing pattern from the CP generator in advance to 
send its every message as an offline process. However 
because of ESEBM configuration, i.e. by dividing the 
network into the CP generator (off-line) and the 
anonymous channel (on-line) parts, every time-consuming 
task is removed from the anonymous channel part and 
highly efficient communication becomes possible. 
Moreover, concealing patterns enable receivers not only to 
send replies to the original anonymous message senders but 
also to receive messages without disclosing their identities. 
Namely, when concealing patterns are publicly disclosed 
with the receivers’ interests, the receivers can receive 
messages from senders without disclosing their identities. 
As a future work, mechanisms that enhance the 
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reliability of ESEBM are necessary. When senders or 
receivers claim that some server is dishonest, ESEBM 
must prove all servers are honest or detect dishonest 
servers if exist. Also, ESEBM must continue its 
operations even some of servers are out of their services. 
REFERENCES 
[1] D. Chaum, ―Untraceable electronic mail, return address and 
digital pseudonyms,‖ Communications of the ACM, vol. 24, 
no. 2, pp. 84-88, 1981. 
[2] D. Chaum, ―The dining cryptographers problem: 
unconditional sender and recipient untraceability,‖ Journal 
of Cryptology, vol. 1, pp. 65-75, 1988. 
[3] M. G. Reed, P. F. Syverson and D. M. Goldschlag, 
―Anonymous connections and onion routing,‖ Selected 
Areas in Communications, vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 482-494, May 
1998. 
[4] M. K. Reiter and A. D. Rubin, ―Crowds: anonymity for Web 
transactions,‖ ACM Transactions on Information and 
System Security, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 66-92, Nov 1998. 
[5] R. Ingledine, M. J. Freedman, D. Hopwood and D. Molnar, 
―A reputation system to increase MIX-Net 
reliability,‖ Proc. of the 4th international Workshop on 
information Hiding. I. S. Moskowitz, Ed. Lecture Notes In 
Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, vol. 2137, London, pp. 
126-141, April 2001. 
[6] A. Beimel and S. Dolev, ―Buses for anonymous message 
delivery,‖ Proc. of the Second International Conference on 
FUN with Algorithms, Elba, Italy, pp. 1-13, May 2001. 
[7] P. Golle and M. Jakobsson, ―Reusable anonymous return 
channels,‖ Proc. of the 2003 ACM Workshop on Privacy in 
the Electronic Society, (Washington, DC), WPES '03, 
ACM, New York, NY, pp. 94-100, 2003. 
[8] R. Dingledine and N. Mathewson, ―Tor: The 
second-generation onion router,‖ Proc. of the 13th USENIX 
Security Symposium, San Diego, CA, USA, pp. 303-320, 
August 2004. 
[9] P. Golle, M. Jakobsson, A. Juels and P. 
Syverson, ―Universal re-encryption for Mixnets,‖ RSA 
Conference Cryptographers' Track '04, Springer-Verlag, 
pp. 163-178, 2004. 
[10] T. Znati, J. Amadei, D. R. Pazehoski and S. Sweeny, ―On 
the design and performance of an adaptive, global Strategy 
for detecting and mitigating distributed DOS attacks in 
GRID and collaborative workflow environments,‖ 
Simulation, vol. 83, pp. 291-303, March 2007. 
[11] S. Y. Kang, J. S. Park and I. Y. Lee, ―A study on 
authentication protocol in offering identification 
synchronization and position detection in RFID system,‖ 
Proc. of The 2007 International Conference on Intelligent 
Pervasive Computing (IPC 2007), pp. 150-154, 2007. 
[12] X. Wang and J. Luo, ―A collaboration scheme for making 
peer-to-peer anonymous routing resilient,‖ Computer 
Supported Cooperative Work in Design, 2008, CSCWD 
2008, pp. 70-75, April 2008. 
[13] S. Tamura, K. Kouro, M. Sasatani, K. M. Alam and H. A. 
Haddad, ―An information system platform for anonymous 
product recycling,‖ Journal of Software, vol. 3, no. 6, pp. 
46-56, 2008. 
[14] L. Li, S. Fu and X. Che, ―Active attacks on reputable Mix 
Networks,‖ ispa, 2009 IEEE International Symposium on 
Parallel and Distributed Processing with Applications, pp. 
447-450, 2009. 
[15] H. Haddad, H. Tsurugi and S. Tamura, ―A mechanism for 
enhanced symmetric key encryption based Mixnet,‖ SMC 
2009 IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man and 
Cybernetics, San Antonio, TX, USA, pp. 4541–4546, 11-14 
Oct 2009, doi: 10.1109/ ICSMC.2009.5346788.  
[16] http://www.idc.com/ 
 
 
 
 
 
Hazim A. Haddad   received the B.E. 
degree in Computer science and 
Engineering from Ittihad University, from 
UAE (United Arab Emirates) in 2003, 
M.S. degree in nuclear and safety 
engineering, from the University of Fukui 
in 2008. He is currently a doctor course 
student of University of Fukui.  
 
Shinsuke Tamura   was born in Hyogo, 
Japan on Jan. 16, 1948, and received the 
B.S., M.S. and Dr. (Eng.) degrees in 
Control Engineering from Osaka 
University in 1970, 1972 and 1991, 
respectively. During 1972 to 2001, he 
worked for Toshiba Corporation. He is 
currently a professor of Graduate School 
of Engineering, University of Fukui, 
Japan. Prof. Tamura is a member of IEEJ, 
SICE and JSST.  
Shuji Taniguchi    received the B.E. 
and Ph.D. degrees in electronics 
engineering from University of Fukui, 
Fukui, Japan, in 1973, 1996, respectively. 
In 1973-1978, he was with the Hitachi co. 
Ltd. He is currently an associate professor 
of Graduate School of Engineering in 
University of Fukui.  
 
Tatsuro Yanase   received the Dr. 
(Eng.) degrees in Electric & Electronic 
Engineering from Nagoya University in 
1977. During 1967 to 1969 he worked for 
Nippon Calculating Machine Corporation. 
He is now an associate professor of 
Graduate School of Engineering, 
University of Fukui.  
1542 JOURNAL OF NETWORKS, VOL. 6, NO. 11, NOVEMBER 2011
© 2011 ACADEMY PUBLISHER
